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BERNARD E. GEGAN*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Some years ago, the New York Court of Appeals decision in
People v. Kibbe1 prompted me to write an article discussing depraved mind murder.2 In addition to murder with intent to kill and
felony murder, the New York Penal Law provides that a person is
guilty of murder when: "Under circumstances evincing a depraved
indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which
creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes
the death of another person." 3 In Kibbe, two robbers drove off af* Whitney Professor of Law, St. John's University; B.S. 1959, LL.B., 1961, St. John's
University; LL.M. 1962, Harvard University. The author thanks Professors Frank S. Polestino and Charles S. Bobis for their many helpful suggestions.
1 35 N.Y.2d 407, 321 N.E.2d 773, 362 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1974).
2 See Gegan, A Case of Depraved Mind Murder, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 417 (1974).
3 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(2) (McKinney 1987). My use of the expression "depraved
mind" in referring to murder, as defined in N.Y. Penal Law section 125.25(2), is a carryover
from the exact language of all former versions of the crime as stated in the predecessors of
the Revised Penal Law of 1967 (e.g., former Penal Law § 1044(2): "a depraved mind, regardless of human life"). The present statute speaks of "a depraved indifference to human life,"
without using the word "mind." See id. § 125.25(2). If this signalled a substantive change, it
did so without the conscious participation of the Revisers, who said that the new statute was
"substantially a restatement" of the old. Temporary State Comm'n on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code, Proposed N.Y. PENAL LAW § 339 (1964). My use of traditional
terminology in the title of my previous essay reflected my agreement with the Revisers that
"indifference" is a condition of the mind. See Gegan, supra note 2, at 417. If the holding of
People v. Register, 60 N.Y.2d 270, 457 N.E.2d 610, 544 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1983), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 953 (1984), establishes that this assumption was erroneous, my use of the same
terminology in the present essay may be unjustified. It is, however, consistent with the substance of my analysis and I am content to have the title stand or fall with the contents.
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ter leaving their victim standing in a snowbank alongside a rural
two-lane highway approximately one-quarter mile from a gas station. The victim was so intoxicated (0.25% blood alcohol) that he
made his way to the middle of the road and sat down. Twenty
minutes later he was run over by a pickup truck and fatally
injured.
While conceding that the defendants should have been convicted of second degree manslaughter for "recklessly caus[ing] the
death of another person, 4 I protested the decision's substantial
and inappropriate enlargement of the scope of depraved mind
murder. More generally, I expressed misgivings about the vague
contours of the crime, its apparent overlap with reckless manslaughter, and its disproportion in comparison with manslaughter
in the first degree, committed with a specific intent to do "serious
physical injury. '
The New York Court of Appeals has decided several depraved
mind murder cases in the intervening years, most notably, People
v. Register' and the recent People v. Roe. 7 That the crime continues to stir controversy is evidenced by unusually outspoken dissents in both cases. I should say at once that none of the recent
cases on their facts are as troubling as the Kibbe case. That case
remains for me the high-water mark of depraved mind murder's
encroachment on situations properly belonging to lesser homicide
categories. The court's recent opinions nevertheless raise legal issues of ongoing interest and prosecutors are thoroughly awake to
the advantages of this form of homicide indictment.8
Register, decided in 1983, is unquestionably the "leading
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15(1) (McKinney 1987).
5 Id. § 125.20(1).
a 60 N.Y.2d 270, 457 N.E.2d 704, 469 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 953
(1984).
7 74 N.Y.2d 20, 542 N.E.2d 610, 544 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1989).
8 Although it is likely that this category of murder was originally designed to cover only
cases of violence not directed at a particular target, see Gegan, supra note 2, at 432, ever
since People v. Poplis, 30 N.Y.2d 85, 281 N.E.2d 167, 330 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1972), it is settled
that it applies to individually targeted fatal assaults. It has become increasingly common to
indict defendants under both; one count charging intentional murder and a second count
charging depraved mind murder. For a procedural discussion, see People v. Gallagher, 69
N.Y.2d 525, 528-31, 508 N.E.2d 909, 910-11, 516 N.Y.S.2d 174, 175-76 (1987). Since depraved mind murder is by definition an unintentional killing, one recent case has held (on
doubtful facts) that it is improper to submit the depraved mind count to the jury where the
People's proof admits of only one inference-an intent to kill. See People v. Gonzalez, 554
N.Y.S.2d 506, 508 (1st Dep't 1990).
4
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case," judging by how frequently it is cited and quoted. In Register, the defendant took a pistol into a bar and predicted that he
was "going to kill somebody tonight."9 After considerable drinking,
he fired at a man with whom he was arguing, missing him but
wounding another. He then shot and wounded the first man.
Shortly thereafter, he fired again, killing a third man. On the trial
of an indictment charging both intentional murder and depraved
mind murder, Register's counsel requested jury instructions on the
effect of intoxication. The judge instructed the jurors that they
should consider whether the defendant's intoxication prevented
him from forming an intent to kill, but refused to charge that intoxication could affect the mens rea of depraved mind murder.
The jury acquitted Register of murder with intent to kill, but convicted him of depraved mind murder. 10
The statutory definition of depraved mind murder requires
that the accused "recklessly" create a "grave" risk of death
"[u]nder circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human'
life." 1 Insofar as "recklessness" is the mens rea, intoxication is not
a defense. According to the general definition in the New York Penal Law, one acts recklessly with respect to a proscribed result
(i.e., death) "when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur.' 2 But
the statute further provides that "[a] person who creates such a
risk but is unaware thereof solely by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts recklessly with respect thereto."' 3 Therefore, one accused of manslaughter in the second degree, in which the mens rea
is simply recklessness, cannot escape conviction merely because intoxication clouded his otherwise clear perception of the risk.
Drunken negligence is equated with sober recklessness as a matter
of statutory policy.
Register argued on appeal that depraved mind murder requires a mens rea greater than simple recklessness, and that it was
reversible error for the trial judge to foreclose jury inquiry into the
effect of intoxication on the "recklessness-plus" state of mind. The
New York Court of Appeals rejected this argument, approved the
trial judge's refusal to give the requested instruction, and affirmed
9 Register, 60

N.Y.2d at 275, 457 N.E.2d at 706, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 601.
10 Id. at 270-71, 457 N.E.2d at 705, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 601.
"1

N.Y. PENA.L LAW § 125.25(2) (McKinney 1987).

12 Id.

s Id.

§ 15.05(3).
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the murder conviction. 14

The court reasoned that the difference between reckless manslaughter and depraved mind murder lies solely in the objective
elements of the two crimes, and not in the mental element, recklessness, which is identical in both. Therefore, since intoxication
cannot negate the mens rea of second degree manslaughter,
neither can it negate the mens rea of depraved mind murder. The
three dissenting judges in Register contended that the murder
statute required "a mens rea more culpable than recklessness alone
and nearly as culpable as intent." 15 They accused the majority of
eviscerating the distinction between manslaughter and murder and
defying a basic principle of fairness.
II.

THE COURT'S TREATMENT OF

Mens Rea

The predecessor of the present statute did not contain the
word "reckless." It applied to death caused by an act "imminently
dangerous to others, and evincing a depraved mind, regardless of
human life."' 16 From the very beginning, courts had interpreted

this provision to require proof that the defendant was fully conscious of the likelihood of a fatal result' 7-which is precisely how
recklessness is defined in the present law. However, an unbroken
series of precedents also required an aggravated kind of recklessness that equated in blameworthiness with the unmitigated wickedness of one who intentionally takes the life of another. 18 The
court in Register reasoned that the legislature's express addition of
"reckless" impliedly repealed the additional dimension of mental
culpability previously understood to belong to the crime of depraved mind murder. The court recognized the difference in
blameworthiness between reckless manslaughter and reckless murder, but stated that the greater blameworthiness is accounted for
by the external facts, not the state of mind.' 9
This conclusion was buttressed by the court's reference to the
14
'
18

Register, 60 N.Y.2d at 271, 457 N.E.2d at 704-05, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
Id. at 285, 457 N.E.2d at 712, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 607 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
See former N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1044(2) (repealed 1965) (cited in People v. Jernatow-

ski, 238 N.Y. 188, 190, 144 N.E. 497, 497 (1924)).
17 See People v. Poplis, 30 N.Y.2d 85, 87-91, 281 N.E.2d 167, 167-69, 330 N.Y.S.2d 365,
366-68 (1972) (construing statute, stressing continuity of former interpretations with one
exception: applicable now to violence toward single victim); Jernatowski, 238 N.Y. at 191,
144 N.E. at 497; Darry v. People, 10 N.Y. 120, 148 (1854).
"8See cases cited supra note 17.
"9Register, 60 N.Y.2d at 278, 457 N.E.2d at 708, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
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Penal Law's general definitional section that sets out four "culpable mental states," consisting of: intentional, knowing, reckless,
and criminally negligent. 20 According to the court, this enumeration was intended to "limit and crystalize" the recognized forms of
mens rea. Since the listing "includes recklessness as one of those
culpable mental states but it does not list 'depraved indifference,' "21 the latter is not a culpable mental state.
The court thus settled the issue of what "depraved indifference" is not, leaving unanswered the question of what it is. As to
this, the court experienced some difficulty:
This additional requirement refers to neither the mens rea nor
the actus reus. If it states an element of the crime at all, it is not
an element in the traditional sense but rather a definition of the
factual setting in which the risk creating conduct must occur-objective circumstances which are not subject to being nega22
tived by evidence of defendant's intoxication.
It is an intriguing suggestion that the statutory language
"under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human
life" might not be an element of the crime at all. Could it be a
preamble, a kind of legislative throat-clearing? Nominally, the
10 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05 (McKinney 1987). The statute defines "culpable mental
states" as follows:
1. "Intentionally." A person acts intentionally with respect to'a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense when his conscious objective is to
cause such result or to engage in such conduct.
2. "Knowingly." A person acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstance exists.
3. "Recklessly." A person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur
or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that
disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a
reasonable person would observe in the situation. A person who creates such a risk
but is unaware thereof solely by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts recklessly with respect thereto.
4. "Criminal negligence." A person acts with criminal negligence with respect to a
result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he fails
to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that
such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that the
failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable person would observe in the situation.
Id.

21
22

Register, 60 N.Y.2d at 278, 457 N.E.2d at 708, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
Id. at 276, 457 N.E.2d at 707, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 602.
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court backed away from this jurisprudential novelty by interpreting the phrase as part of the circumstantial elements of the crime.
"The concept of depraved indifference was retained in the new
statute not to function as a mens rea element, but to objectively
define the circumstances which must exist to elevate a homicide
from manslaughter to murder." 23 By this interpretation, the only
operative difference between reckless manslaughter and reckless
murder appears to turn on the degree of risk created by the defendant. As the court stated: "Because of an inability to quantify
homicidal risks in precise terms, the Legislature structured the degree of risk which must be present in nonintentional killings by
providing that in a depraved mind murder the actor's conduct
must present a grave risk of death whereas in manslaughter it
presents the lesser substantial risk of death. 2 4 Although the court
again equated "circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to
human life" with the difference between "the substantial risk present in manslaughter" and the "very substantial risk present in
murder, ' 25 it is difficult to see how the meaning of the murder statute would change if the controversial phrase were deleted altogether. The difference in the degrees of risk to life is sufficiently
expressed in the terms "substantial risk" in manslaughter and
"grave risk" in murder.
If one were to accept the court's premise that section 15.05 of
the New York Penal Law exhaustively and exclusively defines four,
and only four, culpable mental states, then the rest of the court's
opinion would follow more easily. The premise, however, is shaky.
While the legislature may reasonably be understood to gather into
one place uniform definitions of standardized terms that can then
be used throughout the rest of the statute, it is not sensible to suppose that the standardized terms necessarily suffice for the statement of all specific crimes. If the legislature wants to create some
non-standard, culpable mental state ad hoc in a particular crime, it
should not be hobbled in doing so. To interpret the definitional
section in an exclusive manner converts it from a tool for the legislative drafter into his master. The legislature's desire not to be tied
down to the standardized definitions appears plain from another
general section that assists in statutory construction. This section
23

Id. at 278, 457 N.E.2d at 708, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 602.

24 Id. at 276, 457 N.E.2d at 707, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 602.
21 Id. at 277, 457 N.E.2d at 707, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 602 (emphasis in original).
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provides that when specific crimes require a particular mental
state, such mental state is ordinarily designated by the statute's
use of the terms "intentionally," "knowingly," "recklessly," or
"criminal negligence. ' 26 In light of this provision, why can we not
accept depraved indifference to human life simply as an instance
out of the "ordinary"? The Model Penal Code uses standardized
definitions of culpable mental states, but acknowledges that its
reckless murder provision specifically adopts a culpability require27
ment beyond the standard terms used elsewhere in the Code.
Unless depraved indifference is acknowledged to be a real part
of the mens rea, we are left with a common mens rea of recklessness for both manslaughter and murder, exactly the court's conclusion as to the legislative intent. Since we are not dealing with a
traditionally regulatory or malum prohibitum offense, but with the
gravest felony known to the law, it is anomalous that this should
be the case. How can it be just to punish for murder, one offender
whose mental culpability is no greater than that of another guilty
only of manslaughter-thereby exposing the former to an additional fifteen years of imprisonment?
I hesitate to conclude that the New York Court of Appeals
would admit these inferences or deny that in malum in se felonies,
the offender's guilty mind must correspond to the gravity of the
crime. Despite its resolute limitation of the mens rea of murder,
the court in Register waffled when it acknowledged that the jury
"had to determine from the evidence if defendant's conduct,
though reckless, was equal in blameworthiness to intentional murder."2 8 The court demonstrated further ambivalence in People v.
Fenner, when itcharacterized as "proper" a jury instruction that:
depraved indifference to human life required that they find defendant's "conduct, beyond being reckless ... so wanton, so deficient in a moral sense of concern, so devoid of regard of the life or
lives of others, and so blameworthy as to warrant the same criminal liability as that which the law imposes upon a person who
2 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 15.15(1) (McKinney 1987) (emphasis added).

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (1980). In this murder section, the Model Penal Code defines such recklessness as "circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to
human life." Id. "Recklessly" is defined elsewhere in the Code to mean that the actor consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk amounting to a "gross deviation"
from due care. See id. § 2.02(2)(c).
28 Register, 60 N.Y.2d at 275, 457 N.E.2d at 706, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 601.
"

29 61 N.Y.2d 971, 463 N.E.2d 617, 475 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1984).
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intentionally causes the death of another."3
If a jury is to determine a defendant's "moral sense of concern"
and the quality of his lack of "regard" for the lives of others, and
thereby ascribe to him a degree of "blameworthiness" equal to the
"blameworthiness" of an intentional killer, then it does no good to
deny the relevance of the defendant's subjective mental state.
Rather, his mental state should become the jury's central focus; all
other facts assume merely evidentiary significance. The murder
statute, after all, does not declare that the objective circumstances
surrounding a homicide are depraved indifference to human life. It
provides that these circumstances "evince" such a quality in the
actor.
So tenuous is the court's rationale for refusing to recognize depraved indifference as a mens rea element, and so superfluous did
its interpretation render the statutory language, that one can speculate that the court was simply reaching a desirable result on the
precise issue before it: whether evidence of intoxication can negate
the necessary mental element of depraved mind murder. I submit
that the court should and could have resolved the issue without
mangling the traditional distinction between mens rea and actus
reus.
Persuasive reasons can be advanced to support the holding in
Register. Proof of intoxication is admissible "whenever it is relevant to negative an element of the crime charged."3 1 Statutory policy refuses to diminish the culpability attached to recklessness because the actor lacks awareness of risk due to intoxication. Surely,
that same policy applies equally to the "grave" risk in the murder
statute as to the "substantial" risk in the manslaughter statute. It
is less clear, however, whether intoxication is irrelevant to the
mental state embraced in the phrase "depraved indifference to
human life."
In order to determine whether intoxication negates a culpable
mental state, it is necessary to define the mental state sought to be
negated. Here, the legislature may be faulted for failing to give the
court adequate tools; unlike the four standard culpable mental
states, "depraved indifference to human life" is used without further definition. One may sympathize with the court's difficulty in
extracting the meaning of this archaic expression, without approv-

31

Id. at 973, 463 N.E.2d at 618, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 277.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.25 (McKinney 1987).
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ing its ducking the question by denying the expression any significance whatsoever as a form of mens rea. Murder with a depraved
indifference to human life derives from the common-law concept of
malice. Express malice entailed a specific intent to kill or inflict
grievous bodily injury. 2 But an equivalent degree of blame, under
the rubric of implied malice, was imputed to one who endangered
human life by grossly unjustified risk-taking, albeit without a specific intent to kill.33 Of course, not all risk-taking is blameworthy.
The general who sends troops to take a hostile beach or the surgeon who performs a dangerous operation are esteemed as public
benefactors, not condemned as criminals. Thus, we draw a line between justified and unjustified risks to life. When the risk to life is
both substantial and unjustified, it is condemned as manslaughter,
provided that the actor knew the risk and nonetheless chose to
take it. His blameworthy choice is the mens rea of the crime.
Unjustified risk-taking becomes blameworthy on an ascending
scale, according to the degree of the risk, the degree of unjustifiability, and perhaps such other factors as the helplessness of the
victim and the actor's breach of a special duty owed to the victim.3 4 Blameworthy recklessness, exhibited in any single act which
substantially and unjustifiably endangers human life, can be further aggravated by some combination of factors recognized by the
jury. It may become clear that the actor has a character flaw more
blameworthy than that shown by a single indiscretion; it may even
be established that he simply holds human life without value. This
is not a specific mental state formed at the moment of action, such
as intent or reckless disregard. Rather, it is an immoral predisposition to harm, referred to in older cases as a condition or disposition
of the mind as opposed to a specific operation of the mind. A wellknown case put it as follows:
[T]he act must be prompted by, or the circumstances indicate
that it sprung from, a wicked, depraved or malignant mind-a
mind which, even in its habitual condition, and when excited by
no provocation which would be liable to give undue control to
passion in ordinary men, is cruel, wanton or malignant, reckless of
human life, or regardless of social duty.3 5
See R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 76 (3d ed. 1982).
WSee id.; Mayes v. People, 106 IlM. 306, 312, 313 (1883).
"ISee G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 265 (1978); W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT,
CRIMINAL LAW 618-19 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter LAFAvE & SCOTT].
11 Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 218 (1862). This statement is consistent with New
22
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A conscious endangering of human life springing from such total indifference is a more blameworthy choice than "mere recklessness alone which has had an incidental tragic result."3'6 This, I submit, is the proper understanding of "depraved indifference to
human life" as used in the murder statute. It is an additional aspect of mens rea, but not one negatived by intoxication. One's lack
of concern for human life exists before one gets drunk, subsists
during drunkenness, and continues after one sobers up. 1 Given
the potential for redemption, I will not insist that depraved indifference is necessarily a permanent condition, but neither is it a
transitory specific intent capable of being negatived by intoxication at the time of a particular risky action. This was the commonlaw position with respect to implied malice, from which root our
present depraved indifference standard is derived. 8 If the Register
court had viewed depraved indifference in this light, the decision
would be less open to criticism and the potential for future injustice substantially diminished.
A recent amendment, adding two parallel murder and manslaughter sections, highlights the futility of attempting to distinguish depraved mind murder from reckless manslaughter solely acYork precedent, see supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text, as well as with the precedent
of sister states, see State v. Walton, 133 Ariz. 282, 291, 650 P.2d 1264, 1273 (1982); People v.
Jones, 193 Colo. 250, 254, 565 P.2d 1333, 1335-36 (1977); People by Russel v. District Court,
185 Colo. 78, 83, 521 P.2d 1254, 1256 (1974); Lackey v. State, 246 Ga. 331, 337, 271 S.E.2d
478, 484-85 (1980); State v. Sarabia, 118 Wis. 2d 655, 664-65, 348 N.W.2d 527, 533 (1984);
State v. Weso, 60 Wis. 2d 404, 408-09, 210 N.W.2d 442, 445-46 (1973).
3' People v. Poplis, 30 N.Y.2d 85, 88, 281 N.E.2d 167, 168, 330 N.Y.S.2d 365, 366
(1972).
37 The statement in the text, as a statement of fact, does not overlook the further
fact
that persons who are drunk or drugged often act in a manner more dangerous than when
sober. Intoxicants operate to diminish inhibitions, but this does not exculpate the impulses
thus released. The law does not respond to Jekyll-Hyde imagery. The antecedent fault of
getting drunk offsets any diminished fault at the time of acting dangerously while under the
influence. This is a policy judgment that enjoys wide acceptance. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.08 comment at 357-59 (1980); Paulsen, Intoxication as a Defense to Crime, 1961 U. ILL.
L.F. 1, 2-3; Director Pub. Prosc. v. Majewski, 2 All E. R. 142, 151 (H.L. 1976).
38 See Rex v. Meakin, 7 C. & P. 297, 297, 173 Eng. Rep. 131, 132 (1836); Rex v. Carroll,
7 C. & P. 145, 146, 173 Eng. Rep. 64, 65 (1835); W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON
CRIMINAL LAW

345 (1972); R.

PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW

904 (2d ed. 1969). Depraved mind

murder usually falls into the catch-all category of second degree murder in statutes based on
the 1794 Pennsylvania division of murder into degrees. See Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute CreatingDegrees of Murder, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 759, 759 (1949). Intoxication
will not reduce this type of murder with malice to manslaughter. See, e.g., Neitzel v. State,
655 P.2d 325, 330-34 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); Vam v. State, 83 Ga. 44, 53, 9 S.E. 945, 948
(1889); State v. Caldwell, 385 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Iowa 1986); Commonwealth v. Moore, 408
Mass. 117, 134-35, 556 N.E.2d 392, 403 (1990).
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cording to the difference in the degree of risk. In order to deal with
the special problem of child abuse, both subsections apply to
someone eighteen or over who causes the death of a child under
eleven. It is murder if death results from conduct recklessly creating a grave risk of serious physical injury and under circumstanes
evincing a depraved indifference to human life. 9 It is manslaughter in the first degree if there is an intent to cause some physical
injury and reckless creation of a grave risk of serious physical
4
injury. ,
It will not be possible to distinguish these two crimes on the
basis of the degree of risk: both expressly require proof of a
"grave" risk of serious physical injury and resulting death. In addition, the manslaughter provision requires proof of an actual intent
to cause physical injury.41 Is it possible that the legislature intended a greater measure of mental culpability for manslaughter
than for murder? Such absurdity can be avoided only by acknowledging that "depraved indifference to human life" means more
than a superfluous restatement of a heightened degree of risk. If
this conclusion is forced upon the court in the context of the
newly-enacted child abuse murder provision, can the same phrase
continue to be interpreted differently in the generic depraved mind
murder provision?
" See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(4) (1990) (added by ch. 477, § 4, [1990] N.Y. Laws). A
person is guilty of murder in the second degree when, "[u]nder circumstances evincing a
depraved indifference to human life, and being eighteen years of age or more the defendant
recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of serious physical injury or death
to another person less than eleven years old and thereby causes the death of such person."
Id.
40

See id. § 125.20(4) (added by ch. 477, § 3, [1990] N.Y. Laws). A person is guilty of

manslaughter in the first degree when, "[b]eing eighteen years old or more and with intent
to cause physical injury to a person less than eleven years old, the defendant recklessly
engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of serious physical injury to such person and
thereby causes the death of such person." Id.
41 The murder subsection seems to contain an element additional to the manslaughter
subsection in that it speaks of a grave risk of serious physical injury or death, whereas
manslaughter covers only a grave risk of serious physical injury. This seeming distinction is
wholly illusory. First, the reference in the murder provision is in the alternative: a grave risk
of either death or serious physical injury suffices. Second, by definition in Penal Law section
10.00(10), any injury which risks death is serious physical injury. Id. § 10.00(10) (McKinney
1987). Thus, the only real difference in the two provisions is the requirement in manslaughter for a specific intent to cause some physical injury.
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CASES FOLLOWING Register:

RECKLESSNESS AND THE DEGREE OF RISK

The difficulty with the analysis in Register intensifies when its
reasoning is applied to cases in which intoxication is not at issue.
In such cases, the subjective nature of the "recklessness" test must
be squarely faced. As defined in New York Penal Law section
15.05(3), recklessness requires that the actor be aware of and consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk. For manslaughter, the mens rea exactly corresponds with the actus reus. If
the actor in fact created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of killing someone and in his own mind was aware of that risk but acted
anyway, he is guilty. According to Register, while the mens rea of
depraved mind murder is identical to that of manslaughter, the
difference lies in the actual degree of risk created by the actor's
conduct. To some undefined extent, presumably left without further guidance to the jury, manslaughter becomes murder when a
substantial risk becomes a very substantial one. Thus, the meaning
of grave risk in the murder provision enlarges on the substantial
risk in the manslaughter provision.
One issue remains unresolved: whether the court's acknowledgement that the mens rea is the same for both crimes means
similarity in both type and degree, or similarity in type, but variance in degree. In other words, combining the definition of recklessness in section 15.05(3) with the definition of murder in section
125.25(2), the resulting definition of murder may be read in two
ways, as follows: (1) Being aware of and consciously disregarding a
substantial and unjustifiable risk of death to another person, he
creates a grave risk of death to another person and thereby causes
the death of another person; (2) Being aware of and consciously
disregarding a grave and unjustifiable risk of death to another person, he creates such a risk and thereby causes the death of another
person.
These two possible interpretations may be explored in two
hypothetical cases.
Case (1): A corrupt building inspector takes a bribe to overlook a contractor's use of materials known by the inspector to be of
sub-code quality. What the inspector does not know is that the
materials are not only sub-code, but completely rotten. The building collapses and people are killed. If we assume that the risk
knowingly taken by the inspector was "substantial" and that the
risk actually created by his complicity was "grave," may he be con-
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victed of murder?
Case (2): In a college fraternity hazing, a cup of caustic emetic
is administered to an unknowing, blindfolded pledge. Unknown to
his tormentors, the apparently healthy pledge suffers from serious
stomach ulcers and dies from hemorrhage and shock. Suppose that
a jury is prepared to find that the substance administered was
known by the defendants to be dangerous enough to amount to a
"substantial" risk to any ordinary person. In fact, given the victim's peculiar susceptibility, the risk was "grave." May the defendants be convicted of murder?
Neither the Register case nor any subsequent holding definitively resolves this issue; however, sweeping dictum in the cases
emphasizes the divorce of the mental element of murder from its
external elements. People v. Gomez42 affirmed the murder conviction of a man who deliberately drove his car at a high speed along
a crowded city sidewalk, striking several people and killing two.
The court held that such conduct satisfied the requirement of
recklessness, i.e., conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk. The court said: "The phrase '[u]nder circumstances
evincing a depraved indifference to human life' is not a mens rea
element focusing on the subjective intent of the defendant but
rather involves 'an objective assessment of the degree of risk
presented by defendant's reckless conduct.'-43
The New York Court of Appeals recently decided People v.
Roe, 44a particularly tragic case in which a fifteen-year-old boy
killed his thirteen-year-old companion while playing a type of Russian roulette with a shotgun loaded with bioth live and dummy
shells. The defendant was convicted of depraved mind murder after a bench trial, and the sole question on appeal was the legal
sufficiency of the evidence. The court affirmed the conviction in an
opinion by Judge Hancock, over a wide-ranging and impassioned
dissent by Judge Bellacosa. The court summarized the prior decisions in the following way:
65 N.Y.2d 9, 478 N.E.2d 759, 489 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1985).
4'Id. at 11, 478 N.E.2d at 766, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 158. A certain ambivalence may be
detected in the court's resolution to objectify the crime, because elsewhere in its brief opinion it observed: "The focus of the depraved mind murder statute is to allow a trier of fact to
discern depravity of mind from the circumstances under which an object or instrumentality
is used." Id. at 12, 478 N.E.2d at 762, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 159. This seems to be a sensible
observation, but it remains confusing as to how it appears in the same opinion which denies
that depraved indifference is part of the mens rea.
" 74 N.Y.2d 20, 542 N.E.2d 610, 544 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1989).
42
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The only culpable mental state required for murder under subdivision (2) of Penal Law § 125.25 (depraved indifference murder),
we have made clear, is recklessness-the same mental state required for manslaughter, second degree, under subdivision (1) of
Penal Law § 125.15 (see, People v. Gomez, supra at 11; People v.
Register, supra, at 278). In a trial for murder under Penal Law §
125.25 (2), proof of defendant's subjective mental state is, of
course, relevant to the element of recklessness, the basic element
required for both manslaughter in the second degree and depraved indifference murder (see, Penal Law § 15.05 [3]). Evidence
of the actor's subjective mental state, however, is not pertinent to
a determination of the additional element required for depraved
indifference murder: whether the objective circumstances bearing
on the nature of a defendant's reckless conduct are such that the
conduct creates a very substantial risk of death (see, People v.
Register, supra, at 276-277; People v. Gomez, 65 N.Y.2d 9, 11,
supra).45
Putting aside the special problem of intoxication, in none of
the post-Register cases did the evidence show any gap between the
risk actually created and the defendant's corresponding awareness
and conscious disregard. This issue, therefore, was not before the
court. The facts in Roe, however, came close to presenting it. The
defendant loaded two live shells and two dummies into the magazine of his father's twelve gauge shotgun. He pointed the gun at his
friend and pulled the trigger. The first round fired, inflicting the
fatal wound. Shortly after the shooting, police investigators noted
that the defendant was shocked that the gun operated on a "first
in-last out" order of fire. This suggested that he believed that he
had chambered a dummy to fire first. If so, we would have a situation where a defendant consciously created some risk but was unaware of a circumstance that greatly increased the risk. At his trial,
however, the defendant testified that he had loaded the shells at
random. This testimony, the court noted, made irrelevant his mistake concerning the shotgun's order of fire.46
45 Id. at 24-25, 542 N.E.2d at 612, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 299 (emphasis in original).
4 Id. In his dissent, Judge Bellacosa characterized the defendant's state of mind as no

greater than reckless, and not depraved, even on the basis of having loaded the shells at
random. He supported his conclusion by pointing to various factors: the defendant's youth,
his shock and remorse inmediately after the shooting, and the brief time taken by his action compared to the facts of earlier cases that involved prolonged patterns of cruel behavior. Id. at 30-33, 54 N.E.2d at 615-17, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 303-04 (Bellacosa, J. dissenting). For
example, in Commonwealth v. Malone, 354 Pa. 180, 47 A.2d 445 (1946), the famous Russian
roulette case cited by the majority, the accused loaded his revolver with one bullet, pointed
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Should a case squarely raising this issue come before the
court, stare decisis would permit the court to limit the sweeping
language in its prior decisions to their facts, and adhere to the basic principle that for a person to be held criminally responsible for
a particular result it must be shown that he had a culpable mental
state with respect to that result. To be guilty of recklessly creating
a "grave" risk of death, a defendant should be proven to have acted with a conscious awareness and disregard of that grave risk,
not some lesser risk.
The less we recognize the importance of the actual subjective
quality of an actor's choice and the more we concentrate on the
purely external facts of a case, the more we unhinge the criminal
law from its moral moorings. Some positivists and behaviorists who
see common morality as an alien intruder and an obstacle to putting law on a purely utilitarian, scientific basis would champion
this as a progressive trend.47 But these prophets of a "Brave New
World" have found few converts. Even Oliver Wendell Holmes, the
great advocate of external standards in the law, recognized the
necessary connection between criminal punishment and blameworthiness. "It is not intended to deny that criminal liability, as well
as civil, is founded on blameworthiness. Such a denial would shock
the moral sense of any civilized community. . . ."s Holmes nevertheless asserted that blameworthiness should refer to the standard
of the average person.4" In speaking of murder by reckless conduct,
it at his victim, and continued to pull the trigger until the gun fired on the third pull. Id. at
182, 47 A.2d at 447.
If the trial judge who passed on the facts, and the appellate division judges who exercised a broad scope of review, had assessed Roe's mental culpability according to a proper
legal standard, it would be difficult to conclude that the evidence was legally insufficient.
But, what appears to have happened was that everyone except Judge Bellacosa was content
to base a guilty verdict on a finding (1) that Roe had acted recklessly, and (2) that his act
had created a grave risk of death. All other circumstances and inferences which could be
made as to Roe's indifference to human life were, in the words of the majority opinion,
"beside the point." Roe, 74 N.Y.2d at 27, 542 N.E.2d at 613, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 300. On the
contrary, they are the point.

"' See H.L.A. HART, THE MORALITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 20-25 (1964) (removing issue
of insanity from guilt phase of trial); B. WOOTON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1963); B.
WOOTON, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SOCIAL PATHOLOGY 329-40 (1959) (decriminalizing crime); see
also Kadish, The Decline of Innocence, 26 CAMB. L. J. 273, 273 (1968) (criticizing elimination of subjectivity in crimes); Wasserstrom, H.L.A. Hart and the Doctrines of Mens Rea
and Criminal Responsibility, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 92, 94 (1967) (proper inquiry is moral
culpability).
O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 50 (1881).
Id. at 51. "Liability is said to arise out of such conduct as would be blameworthy in
him. But he is an ideal being, represented by the jury when they are appealed to, and his
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he said:
If the known present state of things is such that the act done will
very certainly cause death, and the probability is a matter of
common knowledge, one who does the act, knowing the present
state of things, is guilty of murder, and the law will not inquire
whether he did actually foresee the consequences or not. The test
of foresight is not what this very criminal foresaw, but what a
man of reasonable prudence would have foreseen.5"

As a matter of sixteenth and seventeenth century legal history,
Holmes was almost certainly right,5 1 although by the time he wrote
in 1881, there was reason to question his accuracy.52 In any event,
his objective standard equates with what the New York Penal Law
calls "criminal negligence," which, if it causes death, is a class E
felony.5 3 Neither murder nor manslaughter in the second degree
can exist without conscious disregard of a perceived risk of fatal
consequence. To recognize that the serious class C felony of manslaughter requires blameworthiness in a more aggravated subjective sense is a valuable bulwark for maintaining proportion in culpability for the most serious crimes.
In speaking of murder, even Holmes recognized that culpable
negligence was a necessary condition of a rule that would not shock
the moral sense of a civilized community. Perhaps such a test
might justify convicting the hypothetical building inspector in case
(1) who should have foreseen the possibility of rotten materials.
However, it could not justify convicting the fraternity hazers in
case (2), who had no way of foreseeing the pledge's peculiar susconduct is an external or objective standard when applied to any given individual." Id.
:0Id. at 53-54.
1 The presumption that people intend the natural and probable consequences of their
acts, see 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2491, 2511a (3d ed. 1940), did not imply that judges
and juries were indifferent to an actor's state of mind; rather, it reflected a practical necessity in an era when the rules of evidence were undeveloped and an accused was not competent to testify on his own behalf. See 2 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 111 (London 1883); Michael & Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide:I,
37 COLUM. L. REV. 701, 709-11 (1937). This presumption was scorned by Holmes as a legal
fiction, disguising the "truth" that blame was assessed according to an objective standard.
See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 178 (1884). Holmes's elegant reductionism itself disguised another truth to which he himself had given classic expression: "The life of
the law has not been logic: it has been experience." O.W. HOLMES, supra note 48, at 1; see

also J.HALL,

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 156 (Ist ed. 1947).
62 2 J. STEPHEN, supra note 51, at 79; Turner, The Mental Element in Crimes at Com-

mon Law, 6 CAMS. L.J. 31, 39 (1936).
11N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.10 (McKinney 1987).
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ceptibility. According to the New York Court of Appeals, an extra
degree of risk separates the lesser "substantial" risk of manslaughter from the greater "grave" risk of murder. That extra degree of
risk is a material element of the actus reus of murder-indeed, it
may well be the only material element distinguishing the two
crimes.
Unless the court requires a defendant's conscious and blameworthy disregard to extend to the extra degree of risk separating
"substantial" from "grave," then as to a material element of the
crime of murder, there will be no culpable mental state. The New
York Penal Law provides that "if an offense or some material element thereof does not require a culpable mental state on the part
of the actor, such offense is one of 'strict liability.' ""' This would
seemingly classify depraved mind murder as a "strict liability"
crime.
Indeed, if simple recklessness with respect to substantial risk
serves to make a murderer of an actor who inadvertently creates a
"grave" risk from which death results, we will have enacted by judicial fiat a new and unusual form of felony murder-an unintentional homicide in the course of the felony of reckless endangerment. Our existing felony murder statute does not list reckless
endangerment or manslaughter among the enumerated predicate
felonies. 5 5 And even the former Penal Law, which was not limited
to a list of enumerated felonies, was interpreted by the courts to
apply only to killings in the course of felonies independent of an
assault on the victim. 6 This doctrine, called merger, was contrived
for the purpose of preserving the moral proportionality of the distinctions between murder and lesser forms of homicide.
At a minimum, therefore, the conscious disregard of the actor
in a reckless murder case must extend to the full gravity of the risk
I" Id.

§

15.10 (emphasis added).

Id. § 125.25(3).
See People v. Moran, 246 N.Y. 100, 102, 158 N.E. 35, 36 (1927); People v. Wagner,
245 N.Y. 143, 148, 156 N.E. 644, 695 (1927); People v. Patini, 208 N.Y. 176, 180, 101 N.E.
694, 695 (1913); People v. Hiiter, 184 N.Y. 237, 244, 77 N.E. 6, 8 (1906); People v. Miles, 143
N.Y. 383, 389, 38 N.E. 456, 458 (1894); Foster v. People, 50 N.Y. 598, 603 (1872); People v.
Skeehan, 49 Barb. 217, 218 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. T. N.Y. County 1867); see also Arent & MacDonald, The Felony Murder Doctrine and Its Application Under the New York Statutes, 20
CORNELL L.Q. 288, 298 (1935) (necessary qualification of felony murder that felony defendant engaged in was independent of homicide); Corcoran, Felony Murder in New York, 6
JOURNAL L. REV. 43 (1937); Communication and Study Relating to Homicide, [1937] LAW
REv. COMM'N REP. 649 [hereinafter COMM'N REP.]; Note, The Doctrine of Merger in Felony
Murder and Misdemeanor-Manslaughter,35 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 109, 117 (1960).
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to life created by his conduct. Both the underlying premises of penal sanctions in a civilized community, and the specific language of
section 15.15 support this conclusion. 57 Even though recklessness is
defined generally as a conscious disregard of a "substantial and unjustifiable" risk, the murder statute's reference to a "grave" risk
should require the jury to find conscious disregard of the level of
the risk which establishes the actus reus of the offense.
This examination of the relation between the extent of the
risk and the actor's conscious disregard thereof should not overshadow another essential point-distinctions of degree with respect to unjustified risk-taking. Various sections of the Penal Law
set forth the standards dividing justified from unjustified conduct.5 Since there are no degrees of innocence, all conduct falling
on the right side of the dividing line is the same for the law's purposes. On the criminal side of the line, however, there are two
homicide crimes based on unjustified risk-taking. If we are to
maintain a morally meaningful distinction between manslaughter
and murder, future cases will require the courts to recognize distinctions in degrees of unjustifiability, just as they have already
recognized distinctions of degree in the likelihood of fatal outcome.
The two aspects are co-variables.5 9
Both the Model Penal Code and the New York courts have
See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.15 (McKinney 1987). Section 15.15 provides that when one
culpable mental state, such as "recklessness," is used in the definition of an offense "it is
presumed to apply to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application
clearly appears." Id.
68 Id. §§ 35.00, 35.05 (justification generally).
69 LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 34, at 619-32. The crime of felony murder demonstrates
the deep-rooted connection between the qualitative element of unjustifiability and the
quantitative element of the extent of risk. Committing a felony is grievously unjustifiable,
even if no apparent risk to life is created. Since this qualitative variable looms so large, it
makes up for a relative lack in the extent of risk to life. In other words, even if a felon
refrains from force likely to kill, he is guilty of murder if death unforeseeably results from a
low-risk action in pursuit of such a reprehensible goal: Id. at 622-25. Where the apparent
risk to life is almost nonexistent and the death seems purely accidental, however, a murder
conviction solely predicated on the felonious unjustifiability of the death-causing conduct
troubles many observers and courts. See Fletcher, Reflections on Felony Murder, 12 Sw.
U.L. REv. 413, 413-15 (1981) (discussing Model Penal Code's attempts to deal with murder
statutes); see also Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 503 n.12, 436 N.E.2d 400,
407-08 n.12 (1982) (citing cases and statutes abolishing or limiting felony murder rule); People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 728, 299 N.W.2d 304, 326 (1980) (discarding distinct doctrine of
felony murder). The Model Penal Code treats killings in the course of a felony as a special
kind of reckless murder. While felony murder in its traditional formulation gives too much
weight to the element of unjustifiability, the current thinking of the New York courts regarding depraved mind murder may give too little.
57
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emphasized that common morality recognizes certain unintended
killings to be as blameworthy as intentional killings.6 0 Note that all
commentators start out with the intentional killing as the paradigm of the greatest culpability. Why? As the Model Penal Code
comments, an intent to kill demonstrates the grossest form of indifference to human life. 1 Where there is an intent to kill, the law
is not concerned with the degree of risk ex ante. If an actor aims a
rifle at a person standing at extreme range, it is unlikely that the
bullet will hit the victim. However, if it is proven that the actor's
"conscious object" was to kill, and he succeeded, he is guilty of
murder. Only in the case of an unintended killing does the law
concern itself with the degree of risk ex ante.
This unique culpability attached to intent may be useful in
distinguishing two kinds of unjustified risk-taking. The notion of
intent combined with the notion of recklessness facilitates our distinguishing the actor who intended neither the risk nor the result,
although consciously disregarding both, from the actor who, although not intending the result, intended to create the risk. A
hunter, in his eagerness to bag a deer, may fire although he sees a
dwelling in close proximity. Another actor, motivated by racial bigotry, may fire at a dwelling to "send a message" to the occupants
that they should move out. Although the second actor may not
have intended to kill anyone in the dwelling, he did have as his
"conscious objective," the goal of frightening the occupants with
the risk of being killed. To the reckless hunter, the risk to the oc'6 2
cupants was quite collateral to his "conscious objective.
60 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 comment 4 (1980); Register, 60 N.Y.2d at 275, 457
N.E.2d at 706, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 601; People v. Poplis, 30 N.Y.2d 85, 87-88, 281 N.E.2d 167,
168, 330 N.Y.S.2d 365, 366 (1972).
01 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 comment 4 (1980).
62 See Duff, Recklessness, 1980 Cram. L. REV. 282, 287 (1980); Duff, Implied and Constructive Malice in Murder, 95 L.Q. REV. 418, 440 (1979). The grossly unjustifiable action of
the terrorist whose goal entails the creation of risk to human life supports a legal distinction
from other forms of recklessness-wholly apart from any quantitative distinction based on
the extent of the risk. Id.
The example of the terrorist illustrates the kind of indiscriminate endangerment to
which depraved mind murder was formerly limited under Darry v. People, 10 N.Y. 120, 145
(1854). Under Poplis, this crime was extended to deadly physical force directed at a specific
victim. Poplis, 30 N.Y.2d at 89, 281 N.E.2d at 168, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 364. Even without a
specific intent to kill, it nevertheless appears to fall within the scope of grossly unjustifiable
conduct. If a mobster shoots an informer in the kneecaps, he may not intend to kill, but he
intends to put his victim's life at risk. A serious incongruity arises when the murder statute
is compared with manslaughter in the first degree, committed with a specific intent to cause
serious physical injury. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20(1) (McKinney 1987). If the knee-
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At the opposite end of the spectrum of unjustified risk-taking,
future cases doubtless will provide examples of mitigating factors
that diminish the blameworthiness of one who endangers human
life because of the stress of the circumstances. Here, again, common morality may find such factors of greater significance than
fine-spun distinctions between "substantial" risks and "very substantial" ones. For example, one man receiving sudden news of his
mother's heart attack may lose his usual self-control and regard for
the safety of others; he may drive at high speeds through traffic
lights on crowded city streets to reach his mother's bedside. Another man may drive in exactly the same manner just for the thrill
of terrifying people. The degree of risk is the same in both cases.
Even if the degree of risk to the lives of others could be characterized as "grave," the extenuating circumstances in the first case and
their effect on the actor's mental culpability dictate mitigation to
manslaughter. However, the second actor's reckless disregard occurs in circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human
life. These contrasting illustrations lead to a discussion of an important unresolved issue: whether extreme emotional disturbance
should be allowed as a mitigating factor.
IV.

DEPRAVED MIND MURDER AND EXTREME EMOTIONAL
DISTURBANCE

Changing the facts of Register slightly, let us suppose that
Register had been taunted and physically harassed by other patrons of the bar before drawing his gun in a rage and firing the
fatal shots. Although he Was indicted for both intentional murder
and depraved mind murder, on the count charging intent to kill,
the statute expressly creates an affirmative defense if he:
acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for
which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the
defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude
a conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any other
capped victim dies, is the mobster guilty of manslaughter one? Of depraved mind murder?
Both? See Gegan, supra note 2, at 438-40 (comparison of depraved mind murder with intent to injure).
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The statute provides a liberalized version of the old commonlaw notion of heat of passion caused by great provocation. Thus,
even should the jury find that Register acted with the actual intent
to kill, it could, with proper instruction, mitigate the crime from
murder to manslaughter, if persuaded by a preponderance of the
evidence that he was overcome by strong emotion.
Suppose that the jury acquits on the intentional murder
count. In deliberating on the depraved mind murder count, what
effect should it give to the circumstances of provocation and the
defendant's excited reaction? The extreme emotional disturbance
affirmative defense quoted above is annexed to New York Penal
Law section 125.25(1), which defines intentional murder. No such
mitigating factor is annexed to subdivision (2), which defines depraved mind murder. As of this writing, two Appellate Division
cases, without extensive opinion, have interpreted the statute to
64
exclude the mitigating factor from depraved mind murder.
This statutory interpretation is seemingly plausible. If the legislature had intended to allow extreme emotional disturbance to
mitigate depraved mind murder, why did it not expressly so provide as it did for intentional murder? Such an interpretation seems
similarly faithful to the language and reasoning of the Register line
of cases. If a defendant's subjective mental state "is not pertinent"65 to the distinction between reckless murder and reckless
manslaughter, then it may indeed be irrelevant that his self-control was overcome by extreme emotional disturbance, whatever the
provocation. Notwithstanding these arguments, I submit that such
an interpretation almost certainly misconstrues the legislative intent, legal history, and rational policy.
The depraved mind murder provision did not originate in the
1967 recodification of the Penal Law. It represents a "rather well
understood"66 category of homicide that has been part of our law
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1)(a) (McKinney 1987).
People v. Watson, 156 A.D.2d 403, 404, 548 N.Y.S.2d 356, 357 (1989), appeal denied,
75 N.Y.2d 925, 554 N.E.2d 81, 555 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1990); People v. Wingate, 72 A.D.2d 955,
955, 422 N.Y.S.2d 245, 246 (4th Dep't 1979). Paradoxically, prior to the 1967 Penal Law,
heat of passion was no defense to intentional murder in New York. See infra notes 69-74
and accompanying text. It was, however, recognized as a defense to depraved mind murder.
People v. Johnson, 1 Park. Cr. R. 291, 297 (N.Y. Gen. T. N.Y. County 1851).
" Roe, 74 N.Y.2d at 24, 542 N.E.2d at 612, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 299.
66 People v. Poplis, 30 N.Y.2d 85, 88, 281 N.E.2d 167, 168, 330 N.Y.S.2d 365, 366
(1972).
63
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from the earliest codification in 1829, and before that, in the common law of crimes.
In contrast to modern penal codes, with their precisely defined
homicide categori6s based on specific mental states, the common
law knew but one murder indictment: killing another with malice
aforethought (sometimes referred to as malice prepense).6 All
other unlawful killings were denominated manslaughter. Unconstrained by statute, the common-law judges developed the concept
of malice aforethought according to their perceptions of who deserved hanging and who did not."' The concept, as judicially interpreted, encompassed intent to kill, intent to do grievous bodily
harm, intent to commit a felony, and wanton recklessness."' Professor Perkins aptly summarized it as a "man-endangering state of
mind. ' 7 0 But whatever type of mental culpability existed in a given

case, both judges and commentators agreed: if the accused were
seriously provoked and lost control of himself in a heat of passion,
he did not act with malice aforethought. 1
87

See 4 W.

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

murder); 3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES

195, 202 (1769) (discussing Coke's definition of

OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

47 (6th ed. 1680). "Murder is

when a man of sound memory, and of the age of discretion, unlawfully killeth . . . any
reasonable creature ... with malice forethought ... " Id.; see also Perkins, A Re-examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L. J. 537, 545 (1934) (malice aforethought covered all
forms of homicide and seems to have meant only intentional wrongdoing).
68 See Royal Comm'n on Capital Punishment Report § 75 (1949-53), reprinted in S.
KADISH & S. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 417 (5th
ed. 1989); 3 J. STEPHEN, supra note 51, at 22 (listing states of mind which constitute malice
aforethought).
88

3 J. STEPHEN, supra note 51, at 22.

Perkins, supra note 67, at 557.
See 3 J. STEPHEN, supra note 51, at 81 (examining effect of provocation at common
law). No writer ever has suggested that the mitigating effect of provocation and passion was
limited to cases of express malice (intent to kill). It consistently has been assumed that it
applied equally to negate implied malice-the forerunner of the present depraved mind provision. See id.; see also R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 32 (malice aforethought requires
"absence of every sort of... mitigation"); LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 34, at 653 (if one in
the heat of passion intends serious bodily injury to his tormentor, but causes death, this is
voluntary manslaughter not murder). Numerous cases either hold or assume that provoked
heat of passion would negate the malice of depraved mind murder. See Waters v. State, 443
A.2d 500, 505 (Del. 1982) (quoting State v. Winsett, 205 A.2d 510, 515-16 (Del. Super. Ct.
1972)); Ramsey v. State, 114 Fla. 766, 768, 154 So. 855, 856 (1934); Dunaway v. People, 110
Ill. 333, 339 (1884); People v. Cowen, 68 Ill. App. 3d 437, 442, 386 N.E.2d 435, 439 (1979);
Robinson v. State, 307 Md. 738, 746, 517 A.2d 94, 98 (1986); Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212,
218 (1862); State v. Poth, 108 Wis. 2d 17, 21, 321 N.W.2d 115, 117 (1982); Hogan v. State, 36
Wis. 226, 236 (1874); see also People v. Johnson, 1 Park. Cr. R. 291, 297 (N.Y. Gen. T. N.Y.
County 1851) (if death is in heat of passion it cannot be classified as murder); Bradley v.
State, 688 S.W.2d 847, 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Rex. v. Thomas, 7 Car. & P. 817, 818-19,
173 Eng. Rep. 356, 357 (1837).
70

71
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Only in light of this proposition can one comprehend the
evolution of the element of "prepense" or "aforethought" traditionally annexed to the word "malice." Although it would appear
that early common law viewed deliberate advance planning as essential,72 it later became settled that no significant space of time or
planning need be established to prove murder.7 3 Had "prepense"
become a meaningless formal pleading requirement? Over time,
the common-law judges realized that some impulsive killers deserved to be hanged just as much as their more deliberate counterparts in wickedness. If, on the other hand, a person suddenly flew
into a homicidal passion after grievous provocation, he was more
weak than wicked and did not deserve hanging. The body of case
law on passion and provocation represented an attempt to draw a
rough line between those who kill because they are driven to do it
on a particular occasion, and those who kill because they are
predisposed to be killers. One so predisposed is equally blameworthy whether he planned a given murder in advance or decided to
do it on a sudden impulse.74 Thus, the "prepense" aspect of malice
came to signify the predisposition to harm imputed by law to one
whose man-endangering state of mind was unprovoked.
Indeed, a review of the old cases, both English and American,
leaves the vivid impression that in expounding the evolution of
malice prepense from its original descriptive meaning to its normative significance as a term of art, the judges were more concerned
712See

3 J. STEPHEN, supra note 51, at 63; see also Perkins, supra note 67, at 545-46

("aforethought" meant "design meditated upon for a substantial period of time in
advance").
73 Perkins, supra note 67, at 546 (time element of malice aforethought eventually whittled away).
7 See 3 J. STEPHEN, supra note 51, at 94:
As much cruelty, as much indifference to the life of others, a disposition at
least as dangerous to society, probably even more dangerous, is shown by sudden
as by premeditated murders. The following cases appear to me to set this in a
clear light. A., passing along the road, sees a boy sitting on a bridge over a deep
river and, out of mere wanton barbarity, pushes him into it and so drowns him. A
man makes advances to a girl who repels him. He deliberately but instantly cuts
her throat. A man civilly asked to pay a just debt pretends to get the money, loads
a rifle and blows out his creditor's brains. In none of these cases is there premeditation unless the word is used iri a sense as unnatural, as "aforethought" in "malice aforethought," but each represents even more diabolical cruelty and ferocity
than that which is involved in murders premeditated in the natural sense of the
word.
Id. (footnote omitted). Accord G. FLETCHER, supra note 34, at 254 (one definition of premeditation involves time and reflection; others wish to include all heinous killings in first
degree murders).
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with the presence or absence of provocation than with any other
single element. 7 5 Specifically, the subjective operations of an actor's cognition and volition seldom troubled the common-law
judges. If an accused committed an act of serious violence toward
another person, especially if he used a weapon, the common law
was unconcerned with his mental processes at the time; unless he
had been acting under the influence of adequately provoked passion, he was adjudged to have acted "of malice. ' 7 This conclusion
was usually accompanied by allusions to a "depraved or malignant
mind" 77 or "a heart regardless of social duty, and fatally bent on
mischief. 7T The same malignity or depravity was extended to one
who, without directing his violence at any particular person, randomly lashed out with deadly force, fall where it might. "9 Writing
in 1762, Foster typified the common-law position when he spoke of
a case in which a house dweller killed a crown officer who had
come to serve legal process. Foster suggested that the officer may
have acted unlawfully in breaking into the house, and discussed
the defendant's violent response:
[A]dmitting that a trespass in the house with an intent to make
75 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295, 307 (1850) (homicide
may be "mitigated out of tenderness to the frailty of human nature"), overruled by, Commonwealth v. McLeod, 367 Mass. 500, 326 N.E.2d 905 (1975); State v. Johnson, 23 N.C. (2
Ired.) 354, 359-66 (1840) (discussing antecedent malice toward victim and role of intervening
provocation); Rex. v. Carroll, 173 Eng. Rep. 64, 65 (1835) (examining sufficiency of provocation); see also G. FLETCHER, supra note 34, at 276 (discussing development of "rule of provocation"); R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 32, at 85-105 (same); Coldiron, HistoricalDevelopment of Manslaughter, 38 Ky. L.J. 527, 538-45 (1950) (tracing development of
provocation defense); Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: I-Provocation,EmotionalDisturbance, and the Model Penal Code, 27 B.C.L. REv. 243, 249-61 (analyzing development of
provocation doctrine). Lawyers and judges have become so preoccupied with the exclusions
and exceptions that their understanding of malice is an essentially negative and empty
residual legal fiction. See, e.g., State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647, 672 (Me. 1973) (Wernick, J.,
concurring) (in Maine, "malice aforethought" is "fictional, metaphysical term of art"); see

also H.

PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION

105-08 (1968) (discussing reduction-

ist or defeasibility theory of mens rea). To attend closely to marginal cases, of course, sharpens our understanding of the positive content of a legal category such as malice. We need
not, though, confuse method with object, nor imitate the art critic who explained the genius
of Michelangelo's David as consisting of the skill in carving away those parts of the marble
that did not belong. For a short, balanced account of the positive and negative aspects of
malice, see R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 32, at 73-75.
,6 See Grey's Case, 84 Eng. Rep. 1084, 1084 (1674); Halloway's Case, 79 Eng. Rep. 715,

715-16 (1629); 1 M.

HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN

454 (London 1800).

Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 218 (1862).
• Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 15 (1868); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 67, at

199; M.

FOSTER, CROWN LAW

257 (1762).

' See Mayes v. People, 106 Ill. 306, 313 (1883).
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an unjustifiable arrest on the Owner, could be considered as some
provocation to a Stander by: yet surely the knocking a Man's
brains out, or cleaving him down with an Ax on so slight a Provocation, savoreth rather of Brutal rage, or, to speak more properly,
of Diabolical Mischief, than of Human Frailty. And it ought always to be remembered, that in all cases of Homicide on Sudden
Provocation, the Law indulgeth to Human Frailty, and to that
alone ....And where the circumstances of Deliberation and Cruelty concur, as they do in this Case, the Fact is undoubtedly Murder; as flowing from a wicked heart, a Mind grievously depraved,
and acting from motives highly criminal, which is the genuine notion of Malice in our Law.80
Malice aforethought at common law was thus a complex, morally sensitive compendium of elements which gradually developed
over a long period of time. It incorporated not only the actor's
man-endangering thoughts and intentions at the moment of action,
but also took into account, in however crude a fashion, his moral
character, as measured by the judge's sense of blameworthiness
and accountability.8 1
Drafters of modern criminal codes have disassembled this
complex compendium and reconstructed its bits and pieces, as the
aggravating and mitigating factors, in separate statutory sections.
The drafters generally have eschewed the common-law concepts
and vocabulary; instead, they have used presumably more scientific
terms to describe "culpable mental states." 82 Subdivision 2 of New
York Penal Law section 125.25 (depraved indifference murder),
however, is exceptional in that it carries forward a basic commonlaw concept in language recognizable to lawyers and judges two
hundred years ago. The serious question is whether it is recognizable to lawyers and judges today.
As anyone who has put together a child's bicycle or tinkered
with other machinery well knows, it is easier to take a complex
thing apart than to put it back together again. Pieces tend to get
lost or put back in the wrong place. To illustrate, let me recount an
obscure piece of legal history.
When New York first codified the criminal law in the optimis80M. FOsTER, supra note 78, at 138.
"' See 3 J. STEPHEN, supra note 51, at 71-73.
'2See, e.g., Robinson & Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REv. 681, 683 (1983) ("common law and older codes often
defined an offense to require only a single mental state").
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tic era of Benthamite rationality, the Revised Statutes of 1829 defined murder as follows:
§ 5. Such killing, unless it be manslaughter or excusable or justifiable homicide, as herein after provided, shall be murder in the
following cases:
1. When perpetrated from a premeditated design to effect the
death of the person killed, or of any human being:
2. When perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to
others, and evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life,
although without any premeditated design to effect the death of
any particular individual:
3. When perpetrated without any design to effect death by a
person engaged in the commission of any felony."3
Manslaughter was defined as the taking of a human life "without a
' This statutory
design to effect death, in a heat of passion."84
scheme not only omitted altogether the specific intent to do grievous bodily harm, but, even more inexplicably, it inserted the mitigating effect of heat of passion in the wrong place: the unintentional crime of manslaughter! What happened to intentional killing
done in a heat of passion upon extreme provocation? Did it slip
through the statutory cracks?
One court suggested that evidence of heat of passion would
negate the "premeditated design to effect death" required for murder in section 5(1). 85 While plausible, this explanation left unresolved the question of where provoked intentional killing fit in
the statutory scheme. It could not fall within the definition of
manslaughter since that covered only unintentional killing, and
heat of passion at common law negated "malice," not intent to kill.
8
As Chief Justice Shaw stated in Commonwealth v. Webster:"
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of another without malice;
and may be ...voluntary, as when the act is committed with a

real design and purpose to kill, but through the violence of sudden passion, occasioned by some great provocation, which in tenderness for the frailty of human nature the law considers suffi83

COMM'N REP., supra note 56, at 848-49 (quoting 1 N.Y. Rev. Stat. pt. IV, ch. 1, tit. 1,

§ 5 (1829)).

86 Id. at 850-51 (quoting N.Y. Rev. Stat. pt. IV, ch. 1, tit. 2, art. 1, §§ 10, 12 (1829)).
81 People v. D'Andrea, 26 Misc. 2d 95, 99, 207 N.Y.S.2d 215, 222-23 (Kings County Ct.
1960).
86 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295, 304 (1850), overruled by Commonwealth v. McLeod, 367
Mass. 500, 326 N.E.2d 905 (1975).
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8
cient to palliate the criminality of the offence .... 7

In the event, the New York courts dealt with the anomaly and
filled the gap by ihterpreting the word "premeditated" to mean
only that the thought must precede the act by some finite space of
time."' This effectively made "premeditation" a dead letter, and
intent to kill became the fixed dividing line between murder and
manslaughter; if the jury found such an intent, heat of passion was
legally irrelevant.8 9 As an additional dividend of poor draftsmanship, heat of passion became an aggravating element of manslaughter committed without an intent to kill; its absence precluded a
manslaughter conviction.9 0
The macabre twist to this story is found in a passing observation made by a distinguished nineteenth century judge, John W.
Edmonds. Near the end of his life, he wrote in reference to the
1829 revision:
I know from conversations with two of the revisers (Messrs. Duer
and Butler), that it was far from the intention of the revision to
make capital punishments more frequent, but on the contrary,
the design was to diminish them. That was expected to be attained by the abolition of "implied malice," and would have been
attained, but for the inadvertent omission of the word "premeditated" in the definition of manslaughter."1

If the manslaughter sections had indeed read: "The killing of a
human being, without a [premeditated] design to effect death, in a
heat of passion," then the case of a sudden intentional killing in
, Id. at 304; accord Smith v. State, 83 Ala. 26, 28, 3 So. 551, 552 (1888); State v. Kennedy, 169 N.C. 288, 294, 84 S.E. 515, 518 (1915); State v. Henderson, 24 Ore. 100, 103, 32 P.
1030, 1030-31 (1893); Seals v. State, 62 Tenn. (1 Heisk.) 459, 462-63 (1874); Quarles v. State,
33 Tenn. (1 Sneed) 407, 410-11 (1853). Heat of passion may also negate an intent to kill in a
particular case, as with intoxication. Chief Justice Shaw's point is that the mitigating effect
of provocation and passion does not depend on its negating any specific mental state.
11 See People v. Clark, 7 N.Y. 385, 393 (1852); People v. Sullivan, 7 N.Y. 396, 397
(1852).
89 See COM'N REP., supra note 56, at 551.
Thus through the seeming failure of the Revisers to provide for homicides
committed with intent to kill formulated at the instant of killing, the word "premeditated" was construed contrary to all ordinary usage, and the death penalty
was inflicted on those who had killed in the heat of passion or in sudden combat
regardless of provocation so long as the intent to kill had existed.
Id. (footnote omitted).
90 People v. Peetz, 7 N.Y.2d 147, 151-52, 164 N.E.2d 384, 386-87, 196 N.Y.S.2d 83, 8687 (1959); People v. D'Andrea, 26 Misc. 2d 95, 102, 207 N.Y.S.2d 215, 223-24 (County Ct.
1960).
91Edmonds, The Law of Murder, 7 ALBANY L.J. 247, 248 (1873).
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the heat of passion could readily have been read out of the murder
section and into the manslaughter sections. Advocates of capital
punishment may well ponder the significance of this chilling
glimpse of legal history. How many defendants who would have
been spared the rope at common law were executed for murder in
New York because a single word may have been inadvertently
omitted from a statute? 92
This excursion back into legal history furnishes some perspective by which to interpret the present statutory scheme. In the
1967 Penal Law revision, extreme emotional disturbance was expressly restored as an affirmative defense to intentional murder.
Thus, one mistake of the past was corrected. However, no such affirmative defense is expressly annexed to subdivision 2 of section
125.25, which defines depraved mind murder. If we neglect the
common law background and our prior statutory development, we
may too easily conclude that such omission means that extreme
emotional disturbance is irrelevant to depraved mind murder. The
more likely explanation is that extreme emotional disturbance is
equally applicable to both murder categories but that the legislature thought an express reference was necessary with respect to
intentional murder but superfluous with respect to depraved mind
murder. Remember Chief Justice Shaw's point: heat of passion negates "malice," not intent to kill; when the legislature reached into
the common law grab bag of murder to extract a defined category
of intent to kill, it, out of necessity, expressly excepted cases of
9 See COMM'N REP., supra note 56, at 554-60. After two abortive attempts in 1860 and
1862, the legislature, in 1873, enacted a statute creating a second degree of murder (noncapital) if the killing was done with intent to kill, but without deliberation and premeditation. See id. The courts continued to allow convictions for first degree murder based on very
short periods for premeditation. See People v. Majone, 91 N.Y. 211, 211-12 (1883); People v.
Leighton, 88 N.Y. 117, 120 (1882). Nevertheless, the addition of a non-capital form of intentional murder facilitated mitigation (if life imprisonment can be so considered) in cases of
intentional killings done in a heat of passion. See People v. Caruso, 246 N.Y. 437, 446, 159
N.E. 390, 445-46 (1927); People v. Fiorentino, 197 N.Y. 560, 563-65, 91 N.E. 195, 196-97
(1910); People v. Barberi, 149 N.Y. 256, 267, 43 N.E. 635, 637-38 (1896).
This harsh, incomplete, and confusing distortion of the common law dichotomy between murder (with malice) and manslaughter (upon provocation and passion) is what Cardozo criticized in his famous essay "What Medicine Can Do for the Law." B. CARDOZO,
What Medicine Can Do for the Law, in LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES (1931). He wrote: "What we have is merely a privilege offered to the jury to find the
lesser degree when the suddenness of the intent, the vehemence of the passion, seems to call
irresistibly for the exercise of mercy. I have no objection to giving them this dispensing
power, but it should be given to them directly and not in a mystifying cloud of words." Id.
at 100.
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heat of passion.93 Depraved indifference to human life, on the

other hand, is an expression carried forward intact from the common law. It comes with all the common law exceptions and exclusions already built in, thereby obviating the need to restate them
as distinct defenses, affirmative or otherwise. Indeed, under Mullaney v. Wilbur94 and Pattersonv. New York 5 it would probably be
unconstitutional to restate as an affirmative defense (to be proved
by the accused) a factual
element necessarily excluded in the basic
96
definition of the crime.

The New York Court of Appeals recently had to struggle with
such an overlap between mental elements in the definition of crime
97
and mental elements in an affirmative defense. In People v. Kohl,
the court considered the constitutionality of a 1984 amendment
that changed mental disease or defect from an ordinary "defense,"
to be disproved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt, to
an "affirmative defense," to be established by the defendant by a
preponderance of the evidence.98 The court held the amendment
constitutional on its face because insanity is a mental condition
not necessarily inconsistent with statutory mens rea definitions,
such as intent to kill. Therefore, a defendant who intentionally
killed a human being because of an insane delusion that God or3 The Model Penal Code's mitigating provision is made expressly applicable to any
homicide which would otherwise be murder. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1980). As a
matter of substance, this fully accords with this author's view of New York law. As a matter
of form, it was necessary for the Model Penal Code to make mitigation expressly applicable
to all forms of murder because the Code's definitions of murder completely eschew the common law concepts. The Code speaks of murder "committed recklessly under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life." This is a purely descriptive
statement. The New York formula, "depraved indifference to human life," incorporates the
common law's normative standard by which implied malice was the antithesis of a killing
done in a heat of passion under adequate provocation. Compare Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421
U.S. 684, 704 (1975) (prosecution in homicide case must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
the absence of heat of passion on sudden provocation) with Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.
197, 210 (1977) (in New York, defendant in prosecution for murder in second degree must
prove by preponderance of evidence the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance to reduce crime to manslaughter). Should the New York Legislature wish, as a matter
of policy, to make extreme emotional disturbance an affirmative defense to depraved mind
murder, it could do so in conformity with the Constitution. It would need only to eliminate
the existing common law terminology from the definition of murder, and adopt the Model
Penal Code definition, with the affirmative defense annexed.
04 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
05 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
"1 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
97 72 N.Y.2d 191, 527 N.E.2d 1182, 532 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1988).
Os N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.15 (McKinney 1989).
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dered him to do so, would have to prove the affirmative defense.
The court, however, recognized that the statute could not constitutionally be applied where the particular type of insanity necessarily negatived the necessary culpable mental state of intending to
kill another person. 99 Presumably, then, the state would bear the
burden if the defendant claims that insanity caused him to think
that he was killing the devil disguised as a human being.
It is difficult to justify the way the cases presently draw the
line between what is and is not constitutionally permissible by way
of shifting to a criminal defendant the burden of proof on a critical
fact. If the conclusions drawn in the two hypothetical examples of
insanity stated above are correct, there is something fundamentally
capricious in the Mullaney-Patterson-Kohltest. Be that as it may,
my point is that the absence of a separate and distinct provision
for an affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance in the
depraved mind section of the statute should not mislead courts
into overlooking the strong probability that New York's definition
of depraved mind murder implicitly includes such a provision. 100
Since the mitigation defense frequently is linked in practice to
claims of self defense, it is worth examining New York's leading
case on the relationship between depraved mind murder and self
" Kohl, 72 N.Y.2d at 198, 527 N.E.2d at 1185-86, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 49. The example in
the text focuses on the mens rea for intentional murder, which under section 125.25 requires
an intent to cause the death of a "person." See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1989).
"Person" is defined in section 10.00(7) as a human being. Id. § 10.00(7).
100 The only decision to the contrary is found in Maine; the steps leading to that conclusion are instructive. See State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647, 662 (Me. 1973). The state of
Maine, for a long time, had a murder statute drawn in common law terminology, i.e., malice
aforethought. There had never been any suggestion that provocation and passion would not
reduce murder to manslaughter. See supra note 71. The burden of showing this mitigating
factor, however, was on the defendant. See Lafferty, 309 A.2d at 662. When the burden of
proof built into this statute was held unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court
in Mullaney the Maine Legislature cobbled together a new set of homicide statutes, combining such provisions as the Model Penal Code's definition of reckless manslaughter and the
concept of traditional depraved mind murder. In construing the manslaughter section, the
Supreme Court of Maine applied the subjective test, i.e., whether the defendant was aware
of the risk. State v. Goodall, 407 A.2d 268, 278 (Me. 1979). Depraved mind murder, on the
other hand, was construed according to Holmes's objective test: whether the defendant
should have foreseen the risk. State v. Woodbury, 403 A.2d 1166, 1171 (Me. 1979). In addition, since the defense of extreme emotional disturbance was appended to the new intentional murder provision, but not to the depraved mind murder provision, the court held that
the defense was unavailable to one charged with depraved mind murder-an unprecedented
finding under Maine law. State v. Michaud, 513 A.2d 842, 852 (Me. 1986). Such are the
fruits of reform!
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defense. In People v. McManus, 0 ' a young man fired a shot at a
group of youths, killing one. The defendant was indicted for intentional murder and depraved mind murder. Although there was
conflicting evidence, the defendant insisted that he had fired the
shot to "scare off" the youths, who were beating and robbing his
friend. The trial judge instructed the jury on the use of deadly
physical force in defense of self or another as it applied to intentional killing, 102 but refused to instruct on justification with respect
to the count charging depraved mind murder.1 0 3 The jury acquitted the defendant of intentional murder, but convicted him of depraved mind murder.
The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the conviction,
agreeing with the trial judge that justification was alien to depraved mind murder.10 4 The court sensibly observed that the definition of depraved recklessness murder necessarily excludes the elements of justification; but that is surely no reason to refuse to
instruct the jury on the defense as applied to the evidence in the
case. What the court inexplicably overlooked is that the coin has
two sides: if depraved mind murder excludes justification, then justification excludes depraved mind murder. On further appeal, the
New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and granted a
new trial.
However, the Court of Appeals failed to address the Appellate
Division's faulty reasoning; instead, it bypassed the question of inherent inconsistency between the elements of justification and the
elements of the crime charged. The court perceived the statutory
defense of justification, by its terms, as applicable to any crime
based on the use of deadly physical force, whatever the mens rea
or actus reus, and that justification trumps all criminal offenses.
The court stated: "The defense must not be viewed as one that
102 67 N.Y.2d 541, 496 N.E.2d 202, 505 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1986).
102 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2) (McKinney 1989).
103The trial justice explained his refusal to charge justification to counsel: "In order for

you to have justification, you must have intent. You are admitting that you killed somebody.
You did it because you were justified. How can you have a reckless depraved indifference
and say you were justified[?] I don't think it applies." People v. McManus, 108 A.D.2d 474,
476, 489 N.Y.S.2d 561, 563 (2d Dep't 1985), rev'd, 67 N.Y.2d 541, 496 N.E.2d 202, 505
N.Y.S.2d 43 (1986).
104 Id. at 478, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 565 (citing Register, 60 N.Y.2d at 270, 457 N.E.2d at 704,
469 N.Y.S.2d at 599). The court reasoned that the test of unjustified depravity in the murder statute is objective, while section 35.15(2) defining the justified use of force is a subjective test based on the actor's "reasonable belief." Id.
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operates to negate or refute an aspect of the crime charged.
Rather, if the People fail to disprove justification, the use of force
is deemed lawful (Penal Law section 35.15) and the defendant is
entitled to an acquittal."' 10 5 The court elsewhere emphasized that
"[d]efense of oneself or one's relations, deemed a natural, inalienable right at common law, justified the use of force, making even
homicide lawful."' 0 6 This right is carried forward in section 35.15,
which "affirmatively permits the use of force under certain
10 7

circumstances."'
The court's ringing endorsement of the right of self-defense
emphasized the distinction between justification and excuse, be-

tween conduct that is objectively lawful, and conduct that; although objectively unlawful, is withdrawn from penal sanction be-

cause the harm-doer is subjectively free from blame. This
distinction has a long and venerable lineage, though its practical
significance is minimal. 108 Even its theoretical validity is questionable in certain close cases. 0 9 Moreover, given that justification can
be based on the actor's reasonable though mistaken belief in the
105 McManus, 67 N.Y.2d at 548-49, 496 N.E.2d at 206-07, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 47-48.
100 Id.
at 546, 496 N.E.2d at 205, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 46.
107 Id.
at 545, 496 N.E.2d at 204, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
108 See J. MILLER, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 199, 255-56 (1934); 3 J. STEPHEN, supra
note 51, at lH.
109 The classic test case for placing justification on purely objective grounds is the policeman who shoots a fleeing robber. If the policeman was not aware that the man was fleeing a robbery and shot him from malicious impulses, may he claim justification based on the
objective facts? The cases say no. In order to claim the privilege the actor must consciously
act with knowledge of the facts that establish the privilege. See Collett v. Commonwealth,
296 Ky. 267, 271-72, 176 S.W.2d 893, 896 (1943); People v. Burt, 51 Mich. 199, 202, 16 N.W.
378, 379 (1883); Reg. v. Dadson, 169 Eng. Rep. 407, 407 (1850).
A growing number of scholars have criticized this result as violative of the basic principle of legality. They argue that justification, as contrasted with excuse, establishes that no
criminal actus reus occurred. If the accused did not commit a criminal act he should not be
convicted for having a mens rea. See A.T.H., SMITH, On Actus Reus and Mens Rea, in
RESHAPING THE CRIMINAL LAW 95, 102 (Glazebrook ed. 1978); G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW:
THE GENERAL PART § 12, at 23-27 (2d ed. 1961); see also Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisitefor Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REv. 266, 288-89
(1975) (allowing punishment for attempt but not substantive crime).
This author would support the traditional position by distinguishing the act element of
the total actus reus from the result element. The law does not regard the death of a human
being, even a robber, as a social good. What may be justified is the act, despite, not because
of, its harmful result. In considering whether the act is justified, one can look to the actor's
knowledge and intent. If, in light of the facts known to the actor, his act was unjustified
when performed, and the result is a recognized legal harm, his conviction accords with legitimate principles of legality. He is not punished for his evil intent alone. Cf. G. FLETCHER,
supra note 34, § 7.4; J. HALL, supra note 51, at 232-33.
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necessary facts, 110 there appears to be a generous dose of excuse
mixed in with the real article."' The McManus case, nonetheless,
leaves unresolved the issue of whether the absence of extreme emotional disturbance is implied in the definition of depraved mind
1 12
murder.
V.

CAN HISTORY, RATIONAL POLICY AND RECENT PRECEDENT BE
RECONCILED?

A.

History

At common law, an intentional killing was murder with express malice." 3 An unintentional killing with extreme recklessness
was murder with implied malice.11 4 This extension recognized that,

in extreme cases, wanton disregard of human life rose to the same
level of blameworthiness as the deliberate taking of life. Malice

could never be found where the accused lost self-control under the
stress of fear, anger, or other passion caused by extreme provoca-

tion sufficient to arouse the average person.
B.

Policy

Criminal sanctions operate both to deter and to remove dangerous persons from the rest of society and incapacitate them from
doing further harm. Persons who temporarily lose self-control

under the stress of great provocation are both less likely to be de110

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15 (McKinney 1989).

11 See Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUm. L. REv.
199, 239-40 (1982).
112 Since the justifiable use of force in defense of a person is presently denominated a
"defense" under the New York Penal Law section 35.00, no practical difference exists between the reasoning of the McManus case and the proposition that justification is necessarily excluded from the definition of any "crime based on recklessness. Under either view,
once the evidence has uncovered the issue of justification, the judge must instruct the jury
that it is for the people to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt. The McManus case does,
however, constitute an invitation to the legislature to modify justification from a defense to
an affirmative defense, to be proved by the defendant. Under the logic of Mullaney-Patterson, the burden of proving an issue extraneous to the definition of the crime charged may
constitutionally be shifted to the defendant. If this were to happen, then the court would
have to more closely examine whether there is an overlap between the elements of justification necessarily excluded in the definition of a recklessness-based crime and the elements
embraced in the separate affirmative defense. See R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 32, at
79-80. This would embroil the court in the same dilemma that it finessed in Kohl, 72 N.Y.2d
at 191, 527 N.E.2d at 1182, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
112 See R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 32, at 71.
11 See id.; Mayes v. People, 106 IM. 306, 313-14 (1883).
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terred by the threat of punishment and present less of a threat of
further harm than those who commit the same acts as an unforced
expression of their normal characters. Hence, we mitigate the punishment upon a showing of extreme emotional disturbance. The
policy is similarly applicable to those who kill intentionally or
through gross recklessness. Indeed, it seems actually perverse to
allow mitigation only to those who intentionally do the greatest
harm known to the law but deny it to those who, however reckless,
did not actually intend the harm.
C. Precedent
In distinguishing reckless manslaughter from depraved reckless murder, the New York Court of Appeals has attempted to objectify the distinction completely: the sole difference lies in external circumstances, the culpable mental state of both crimes being
identical. At the same time, the statute expressly mitigates murder
with intent to kill to manslaughter in cases of extreme emotional
disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse.
The problem is whether the precedents objectifying depraved mind
murder preclude mitigation based on extreme emotional disturbance. History and policy together indicate that mitigation should
be allowed: Are the recent cases irrevocably opposed?
One way to resolve the question would be to abandon the ratio
decidendi of the Register line of cases which equate the culpable
mental state of depraved reckless murder with that of reckless
manslaughter. This, to me, would be the soundest solution for the
long term. When a statute provides that a defendant's reckless act
becomes murder when committed "under circumstances evincing a
depraved indifference to human life," it requires proof of a "guilty
mind" and "vicious will" much worse than ordinary recklessness.
The jury should not be told that the only mental culpability is the
same as that for manslaughter and they should not be told that
greater blameworthiness can be found in the external circumstances alone. First of all, the jury is unlikely to accept a proposition so counter-intuitive; only the legal mind can accomplish such
a feat. Secondly, not having legally-trained minds, jurors must be
mystified when, after receiving such an instruction from the trial
judge, they are further instructed, in the language of the Fenner
case, to decide whether the "defendant's 'conduct, beyond being
reckless[, was] so wanton, so deficient in a moral sense of concern,
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so devoid of regard of the life or lives of others, and so blameworthy as to warrant the same criminal liability as that which the law
imposes upon a person who intentionally causes the death of another.' 115 Even if we set aside for a moment all the legal history
of malice aforethought upon which our depraved mind murder provision has been built, there seems to be a distinction on the face of
the present statutes between "conscious disregard" of the risk of
killing someone (manslaughter) and a "depraved indifference" to
human life itself. One may have the normal respect for life and
still act in disregard of the risk on a particular occasion, especially
under extraordinary stress. Indifference to the lives of others, on
the other hand, connotes a predisposition or character trait in'
which the lives of other people count for nothing in the actor's
scheme of things; in the vernacular, he couldn't care less. This requires the jury to make a normative finding on mens rea that
trandscends any of the four statutory culpable mental states defined in section 15.05, particularly recklessness. Each of the four
standard terms focuses on the actor's knowing and choosing at the
precise moment he commits a voluntary act, not his vicious predisposition.11 The jury charge approved in Fenner directs the jury to
make precisely such a normative judgment of blameworthiness and
accountability.
Undoubtedly, the degree of risk is important evidence on this
point, as would be the total absence of any redeeming legitimate
purpose for the defendant's behavior. The jury's task may doubtless become difficult in particular cases, but it does not help to set
them to it with "a mystifying cloud of words 1 1
15

7

from the trial

Fenner, 61 N.Y.2d at 973, 463 N.E.2d at 618, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 277.

See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
The distinction between specific active operations of the mind versus a static disposition of the mind finds an analogy in the imposition of criminal liability for negligence. Since
negligence consists in a failure to think or foresee, some critics have insisted that it is not a
real mental state and should not be the basis for criminal liability. J. HALL, supra note 51,
at 166-67; G. Williams, supra note 109, at 102-03. If, however, it is acknowledged that inadvertence under circumstances that cry aloud for care is a manifestation of an underlying
culpable attitude towards others, the supposed difficulty is overcome. If a bridegroom fails
to appear at the wedding ceremony, is he absolved from blame when he exclaims "I forgot"?
See G. FLETCHER, supra note 34, at 398-400; Duff, Recklessness, supra note 62, at 282.
When the law, under appropriate circumstances, imposes a duty to act, there may arise
criminal liability for failure to act. G. FLETCHER, supra note 34, § 8 (criminal omissions).
The law may likewise impose a duty to advert to the consequences before one chooses to
act. It can be said then, that omitting to think when one should think may be as culpable as
omitting to act when one should act.
'1
B. CARDOZO, supra note 92.
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judge.
That a Register instruction and a Fenner instruction now may
be given in the same case exposes a fundamental ambivalence in
our understanding of the guilty mind in depraved mind murder.
But ambivalence, and even confusion, is better than clear-cut
wrongheadedness; a Register instruction coupled with a Fenner instruction is far superior to a Register instruction standing alone.
That the subjective culpability of a defendant be addressed under
a pseudonym, or even as a nameless orphan of the divorce of mens
rea from actus reus, is better than not addressing it at all.
My difference with the court's doctrine on mens rea cannot be
reduced to a mere problem of semantics. It goes to the heart of
how a lay jury is to be guided in thinking about a defendant's guilt.
However, we must recognize the force of stare decisis; the New
York Court of Appeals is unlikely to depart from a position repeatedly taken in a series of recent cases. If extreme emotional disturbance is to be recognized as a mitigating factor in depraved mind
murder, it should be reconciled with existing doctrine.
A second possible solution would be to relate the "reasonable
explanation or excuse" component of mitigation to the objective
circumstances attending the homicide and conclude that such mitigating circumstances negate the aggravating circumstances that elevate reckless manslaughter to reckless murder. This solution has
some attractions. It would allow the court to maintain its doctrine
that the mens rea of depraved mind murder is recklessness pure
and simple while at the same time recognizing the existence of mitigating circumstances. Of course, since the court has stated that
the only difference between the external elements of the two
crimes lies in the greater degree of risk implied in the adjective
"grave" in the murder section versus the adjective "substantial"
required for manslaughter, it would require the court to broaden
the scope of relevant circumstances. The facts which could establish provocation of the actor are usually different from the facts
which establish the degree of risk created by the actor's violent
reaction to the provocation. But such a minor fine-tuning of its
ratio decidendi would be a small price to pay for maintaining the
chief point insisted on by the court: the lack of any difference in
the mentes reae of the two offenses.
This attempt to "objectify" the mitigating element also maintains continuity with the common law background to the extent
that the common law did not allow heat of passion in a purely sub-
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jective sense as mitigation. Indeed, the law books are full of cases
evaluating the objective facts giving rise to heat of passion according to a "reasonable person" standard. 18
As Michael and Wechsler wrote in their landmark study:
bther things being equal, the greater the provocation, ... the
more ground there is for attributing the intensity of the actor's
passions and his lack of self-control on the homicidal occasion to
the extraordinary character of the situation in which he was
placed rather than to any extraordinary deficiency in his own
character. While it is true, it is also beside the point, that most
men do not kill on even the gravest provocation; the point is that
the more strongly they would be moved to kill by circumstances
of the sort which provoked the actor to the homicidal act, and the
more difficulty they would experience in resisting the impulse to
which he yielded, the less does his succumbing serve to differentiate his character from theirs. 119
When all is said and done, however, there remains what, to
me, is an insuperable obstacle to any attempt to explain mitigation
in purely objective, circumstantial terms. At bottom, the basis of
the mitigation is "extreme emotional disturbance," or as a previous
generation would have said, "heat of passion." It is simply not possible to exclude from consideration the actual subjective mental
and emotional condition of the actor. Certainly, the common law
did not exclude such inquiry. Even where the provoking circumstances were sufficient to make the hypothetical average person
lose self-control, if the testimony showed that the defendant, being
made of sterner stuff, killed in cold blood, he was guilty of murder. 120 Alternatively, if an actor, having been reasonably roused
into a heat of passion, "cooled off" sooner than the average man
21
and killed in cold blood, he was guilty of murder.'

Bearing in mind that there is no express statutory affirmative
" See LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 34, at 654-58; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note
32, at 85-88; Ashworth, The Doctrine of Provocation,35 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 292, 298-99 (1976);
Note, Manslaughter and the Adequacy of Provocation:The Reasonablenessof the Reasonable Man, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1022 (1958). For a thorough historical survey suggesting
that the objective limitations on heat of passion were corruptions of a simple subjective
standard in early common law, see Singer, supra note 75, at 280-83.
110 Michael & Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide II, 37 COLUM. L. REv.
1261, 1281 (1937).
110 LAFAvE & ScoT, supra note 34, at 660-61; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 32,
at 98.
121 LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 34, at 662-63; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 32,
at 101.
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defense of extreme emotional disturbance for depraved mind murder, this mitigating factor either must be implied in the definition
of the crime itself or else be disallowed altogether. If extreme emotional disturbance necessarily entails inquiry into the defendant's
subjective mental and emotional condition, how is the court to reconcile its precedents which identify the mens rea of depraved
mind murder with that of reckless manslaughter-as to which all
admit that extreme emotional disturbance is irrelevant?
The third possible path to reconcile the court's holdings with
the demands of rational penal policy and historical continuity involves a distinction between mental states that establish culpability and those that diminish it. Register's holding that depraved
mind murder does not require proof of recklessness plus some aggravating mental element does not preclude a holding that would
admit proof of some subjective condition that subtracts from the
culpability of recklessness. Note the court's statement in Roe: "Evidence of the actor's subjective mental state, however, is not pertinent to a determination of the additional element required for depraved indifference murder: whether the objective circumstances
bearing on the nature of a defendant's reckless conduct are such
that the conduct creates a very substantial risk of death." 122 This
can be read as eliminating the relevance of the actor's state of
mind for all purposes, or, more appropriately, as limited to its irrelevance as an aggravating element.
A further distinction worth noting is that between an individual's mental state and his emotional state. The four standardized
definitions of "culpable mental states" are just that: states of cognition and volition-knowing, thinking, and choosing. The Register
line of cases only establishes that recklessness as a culpable
"mental state" is sufficient to establish guilt for murder. These
holdings have no bearing whatever on the distinct question of
whether a particular emotional state may mitigate the degree of
blame that would attach to a particular mental state in the absence of such emotion.
The suggested interpretation would restore some vitality to
the statutory language "a depraved indifference to human life,"
which otherwise seems to be read out of the murder statute. Extreme emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable expla122

added).

Roe, 74 N.Y.2d at 24, 542 N.E.2d at 612, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 299 (1989) (emphasis
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nation or excuse does not negate ordinary recklessness. The one
can logically and realistically coexist with the other. But if the
recklessness occurs in the kind of grave risk circumstances that
would otherwise elevate the offense to murder, then the existence
of a condition of extreme emotional disturbance (subjective) reasonably explained or excused (objective) can mitigate the actor's
culpability to reckless manslaughter. In sum, recklessness, however
grave the risk, which is the product of passion under great stress, is
by definition not depraved indifference to human life.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Next to the basic policy that punishment should fall only on
the guilty and not the innocent, the most fundamental policy of
any system of graded punishments is that even the guilty should
not be punished beyond their deserts. Respect for the law could
not be maintained otherwise. A corollary of the last point is that
an offender's deserts are inextricably connected with his subjective
state as much as with the harmful consequences he caused or the
circumstances in which he acted. Free will, choice, blameworthiness, and accountability are the stuff of what our forebears called
mens rea.
There is no doubt that as an historical matter there emerged
from the early attribution of strict liability for harmful acts a core
concept of mens rea in criminal law: actus non facit reum nisi
mens sit rea. As Blackstone said: "An unwarrantable act without a
vicious will is no crime at all."'12 3 This premise developed primarily
in the context of claims of justification, excuse, and mitigation.
As the common law of crimes came to be superseded largely
by statutory codes with the "mental element and external elements
more or less precisely defined for each crime, the notion of a common core of mens rea was pushed into the background. Some
scholars argued that the idea of mens rea itself was superfluous
and that analysis need focus only on the mentes reae of specific
crimes. 124 The proliferation of statutory offenses malum prohibitum intensified this trend away from maintaining a consensus on
4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 67, at 21.
Reg. v. Tolson, 23 Q.B.D. 168, 184-92 (1889) (Per Stephen, J.); 2 J. STEPHEN, supra
note 51, at 94-95; Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 944-1004 (1932); Sayre, The
Present Signification of Mens Rea in Criminal Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 399, 404
(1934).
12

124
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the common core of mens rea.
I am also convinced that one pernicious byproduct of the Mullaney-Patterson-Koh125 line of cases is that by insisting that the
burden of proof can be shifted to the defendant only on elements
extrinsic to the definition of the crime, we have generated a reverse
effect of reading important elements out of the crime in order that
they may be upheld as affirmative defenses. Of course, a man who
is insane can "intend" a consequence. But if his insanity renders
him irresponsible and morally and legally unworthy of blame, has
he acted with "mens rea"? And if the burden of proving that issue
may validly be placed on the defendant under Mullaney and Kohl,
has mens rea been pushed out of the definition of crimes such as
murder?
I am not arguing against shifting the burden of proof as such;
I would like to bypass that controversy in this discussion. What
troubles me is the legal reasoning used by the courts to justify such
a shift. Even where burden of proof is not an issue, I am afraid
that judges will have taught themselves to think of the "guilty
mind" as something extrinsic to crime and punishment. Murder is
the gravest felony known to our law. People were once put to death
in New York for committing it, and may be again some day. Even
where the murder statute speaks of a depraved indifference to
human life, the New York Court of Appeals holds that the mental
culpability is no different than that for reckless manslaughter. The
notion of mens rea as the "vicious will" corresponding to the gravity of the crime has become invisible. Or, at least, it has lost its
identity. While the court acknowledges that murder with depraved
indifference is more blameworthy than reckless manslaughter, it
accounts for the difference by purely external circumstances.
I have argued that such reasoning distorts the legislative intent in the depraved mind murder statute, ignores two hundred
years of legal history, and provides the jury with ambiguous and
confusing instructions.
Even if these criticisms are unavailing and current doctrine remains unchanged, it is unnecessary to extend the doctrine to exclude extreme emotional disturbance as a mitigating factor in a depraved mind murder case, as some lower courts have done. None of
the New York Court of Appeals' holdings require such a result and
125

Patterson,432 U.S. at 210; Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 704; Kohl, 72 N.Y.2d at 197, 527

N.E.2d at 1185, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 48.
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every consideration of historical continuity and moral proportionality supports the contrary result. If the concept of depraved indifference to human life means anything at all, it excludes by necessity an actor whose reckless violence was the product of intense
passion provoked by sources that reasonably account for his emotional state.
As the statute presently reads (depraved indifference) the burden of proof rests with the People. If the legislature wishes as a
matter of policy to make mitigation an affirmative defense, as in
intentional murder, I see no constitutional obstacle to doing so,
provided that the definition of the crime is rewritten to eliminate
the common-law concept of depraved indifference and replace it
with a purely factual description of the mental state along the lines
126
of the Model Penal Code.

12I

See supra note 93 and accompanying text.

